Assessment for Corsicans in France

View Group Chronology

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The Corsicans’ behavior diverges from many other minority groups in that their persistent rebellion is not mirrored by many factors known to cause such rebellion, such as: 1) high levels of group organization and cohesion, 2) regime instability, 3) and government repression. While Corsicans as a people appear to be highly cohesive with high levels of territorial concentration, organizations, particularly the violent separatists, have varying levels of cohesion. In contrast, factors that are thought to inhibit rebellion have not worked in Corsica, such as: 1) residing in a democratic regime, 2) efforts at negotiation and reform, and 3) lack of serious regional armed conflicts.

The chances for containing these sporadic acts of terrorism are largely determined by how well recent reforms were accepted by conventional parties, and their ability to control the militant aspects of Corsican society. The greater threat to peace, however, seems to lie with the Corsicans themselves. Though the majority of Corsican nationalist violence does not take lives, there is a very strong criminal element intertwined with the nationalist movement, making any type of self-government seem unlikely. If the sporadic allegations that Corsican bombings are financially and criminally - rather than politically - motivated prove true, the quest for separatism may be cast in an entirely different light. In the meantime, however, the bombings seem likely to continue. Moreover, the resignation of the Minister of Interior, the rejection of formal autonomy proposals from the government to Corsicans, and political turmoil over the island do not show signs that the conflict will abate.

While the Corsicans lack many of the factors encouraging protest such as political and cultural restrictions, democratic regime instability and kindred support, recent protest activity suggests that protest may continue to be a tactic used by Corsicans. Recent repression of the group may also be a contributing factor in future protests.

top

Analytic Summary

Prior to colonization, Corsica is described as having a clan-like structure of pastoral groups. International presence on the island started as early as the 6th century BC with the presence of the Greeks who set up a naval base on the island, but interfered little with the administration of the clans. In 260BC the Romans came to the island and created several cities. Beyond the introduction of Latin and Christianity to the Corsicans, the Romans interfered little with the island’s autonomy. However, it was no longer independent but, rather, an imperial province. With the fall of Rome, Corsicans suffered a number of invasions by Visigoths until Pisa gained control of the island in 1077AD, transferring power to Genoa in 1347. After four centuries of rule by Genoa, a movement for independence led by Pasquali Paoli in 1755 emerged. Paoli’s initial success in ruling and creating and independent state would be halted with the eventual annexation of Corsica by France in 1769.

Corsican nationalism is well rooted in the Mediterranean island’s native inhabitants (AUTON2 = 1). They are largely concentrated on the island of Corsica in the Mediterranean sea (GROUPCON = 3) and are unique from mainland France in their language (LANG = 1). The Corsican language, known as Corsu, is a mixture of French and Italian. However, the Corsican proportion of the island’s population has dwindled over the last half-century due to the immigration of mainland French, Italians, and North African Muslims, and emigration of young native Corsicans seeking greater economic opportunities. Despite this, they remain a highly cohesive group. They are represented by numerous conventional and militant organizations, the largest being the Front de la Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC). The majority of Corsicans maintain that they wish to remain with France, but most support the achievement of greater autonomy through democratic methods. Under Mitterrand’s administration in 1982, Corsica was given more autonomy than is normally allotted a région in the French system. The new autonomy gave the Corsicans their own Assembly. In 1991, it gained an executive council. The militant organizations that call for full independence are numerous, unorganized, and contain non-political criminal elements; random bombings and sporadic acts of terrorism are their modus operandi (SEPX = 3).

The Corsicans experience little demographic stress, but they are relatively poor because of historical marginality. The French government has, however, created some remedial policy such as guaranteeing 40-45% of jobs in the SNCM Ferry company to Corsicans after the 2005 strike (ECDIS06 = 1). The island suffers economically due to its isolation and seasonal dependence on tourism; to offset this, Corsica is highly subsidized by public funds from the national government, but there have been calls that due to their economic situation this funding needs to be increased. A recent move in 2005 to privatize the government-owned SNCM ferry company sent the Corsican STC union of ferry workers on a 24-day strike consisting of riots and an unarmed hijacking of a ferry boat. Furthermore, one economic grievance, which is difficult for any level of government to address, is the Corsicans’ belief that most of the tourist facilities on the island are owned by non-Corsicans, thereby denying the Corsican people larger profits from their land, because, instead, they work at the resorts and receive less money.

Corsicans are not politically discriminated against on the national-level and have members in the National Assembly (Assemblé Nationale) (POLDIS06 = 0), but the greatest concern for Corsicans is focused on regional political and cultural grievances such as increased autonomy or independence for Corsica and more financial aid and jobs for the island (POLGR06 = 4: ECGR06 = 2). Yet despite the lack of political discrimination, the creation of an assembly and, later, that of an executive council, the bombing campaigns have continued.

FLNC attacks targeting the French government began in the late 1970s (REB75X = 2); rebellion reached a high in 1996-97 (REB96-97 = 4), but then returned to more average levels. In 1998, a separatist Corsican organization claimed the assassination of Corsica’s French Préfet, the top French official representing the central government on the island. Overall, the level of violence has remained fairly consistent over the last 25 years (REB01-03 = 2; REB04 = 1; REB05-06 = 2), usually in the form of bombings of French government buildings (such as the Post Offices) or businesses (banks, hotels, etc.). These bombings, while persistent, very rarely cause serious damage or deaths as they are often empty when bombed. Protest has remained low in comparison to the levels of rebellion (PROT01-03 = 2), but saw a slight increase in 2004-2005 (PROT04-05 = 3; PROT06 = 0). This likely indicates that the majority of Corsicans do not support the terrorist campaigns of the FLNC, and many smaller organizations such as the Fronte Ribellu, Clandestinu, and the Armata Corsa.

In May 2001, the French national government controversially voted to increase the power of the Corsican legislature, and to increase protection for the Corsican language and culture on the island by 2004. These were major demands by the Corsican public, particularly those who do not favor full independence.

top

References

Jaffe, Alexandra "Corsica on Strike: The Power and Limits of Ethnicity" Ethnic Groups, 8, 1990. pp. 91-111.

Meister, Ulrich "Corsica: Colonial Complexes and Ambivalent Nationalism" Swiss Review of World Affairs, 39 (8), November 1989. pp. 22-5.

Lexis-Nexis news reports 1990-2006.

Richards, Claudina. Devolution in France:the Corsican Problem. European Public Law; Sep2004, Vol. 10 Issue 3, pp. 481-502,

Thompson, Ian B. “Settlement and Conflict in Corsica.” New Series, Vol. 3, No. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World. (1978), pp. 259-273.

United States Department of State. “France: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” United States Department of State. 2004-2006.

top