Assessment for Abkhazians in Georgia

View Group Chronology

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The Abkhaz exhibit many factors that increase the likelihood of conflict in the future if the dispute over the status of Abhazia remains unresolved: the group has experienced both repression and rebellion in the recent past; it is highly organized both militarily and politically; and is the vast majority of Abkhaz are concentrated in a distinct region of the country. Further, the new Georgian leadership under Saakashvili has demonstrated a willingness to engage in brinkmanship to re-unite the fragmented country, and this poses a serious risk for renewed violence.

The central government has little to no influence over Abkhazia: the Abkhaz vote in their own regional elections, raise their own armies, and pay taxes to Sukhum(i) (the regional capital), not to Tbilisi (Georgia’s capital). The Abkhaz demand recognition of their de facto independence, which is something that the Georgian leadership is adamant it will not cede. Although negotiations continue haphazardly, and while there is substantial external pressure on both sides to reach a settlement, Georgia's democracy remains unstable and the Abkhaz have not participated in Georgian politics for more than a decade. Levels of violence for most years post-2000 have been low, with relative peace maintained by a UN observer mission (UNOMIG). However, in 2008, renewed violence, involving land, air and sea warfare, directly involved Russian troops in a five-day conflict with Georgian troops on one side and Russian, Ossetian and Abkhazian troops on the other. While a peace agreement was mediated, tensions remain high on all sides.

top

Analytic Summary

The Abkhaz reside in the self-governing autonomous region of Abkhazia in northwestern Georgia (GROUPCON = 3). The group won de facto independence for their traditional homeland in a bloody civil war which ended at the negotiating table in May 1994, and virtually no ethnic Abkhaz remain under the political control of Tbilisi’s authorities. The political status of Abkhazia today is one of the most contentious issues in the Caucasus.The Abkhaz are traditionally mountain dwellers, known for their horsemanship, fighting ability and legendary longevity. Abkhaz nationalists trace their history back past the middle ages. They have always displayed a high degree of group cohesion, and this was further reinforced by the war for independence.

An enormous influx of non-Abkhaz occurred throughout the Soviet period, encouraged by Stalin, who was an ethnic Georgian, and his lieutenant, fellow Georgian Beria. Hence, many Abkhaz blame Stalin for turning them into a minority in their own land, although Abkhaz grievances related to demographic issues stretch back into the Tsarist era. According to the final Soviet census (1989), at the time of Georgian independence Abkhaz comprised only 18 percent of the population of their region. Today, after their victorious struggle for quasi-independence and a mass exodus of ethnic Georgians, the Abkhaz may make up anywhere from a third to a half of their region's shrinking population. The primary grievance, politically, is a demand for unconditional independence, recognized by Tbilisi and internationally (POLGR04-06 = 4); there is further discussion among the political elites over the benefits of integration with the Russian Federation. While religion (Islam versus Christianity) is perceived by some as being a factor in several Caucasian disputes, the Abkhaz conflict springs from competing visions of nationalism and ethnicity, with religion not playing a role.

In large part, Abkhaz historical grievances have been economic in nature: Abkhazia's Black Sea coastline features some of the choicest vacation spots in the former Soviet Union, and during Soviet times the Abkhaz believed that tourist revenues which were their proper due were instead diverted into Tbilisi's coffers by greedy Georgian officials. The relative prosperity of the region was destroyed by the war and massive emigration of ethnic Georgians that accompanied it, leaving Abkhazia today as one of the most economically depressed regions in Georgia. Ironically, since the region has had de facto independence for over a decade, rarely are economic grievances mentioned (ECGR04-06 = 0). In 2007 the leadership put forth an economic demand, which was to compensate the territory for damages caused by the war and ensuing economic blockade; the leadership put the total at $13 billion.

The 1992-1993 war led to thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands displaced. Both sides have been accused of war crimes and "ethnic cleansing" during the conflict; however, since the Abkhaz ultimately succeeded in securing territorial control, it was ethnic Georgians who remain displaced from their homes. Repatriation remains a contentious issue between the Abkhaz and the Georgian governments. More than a quarter of a million Georgians left Abkhazia during the war, some by choice and some by force. Since losing control of the region, Shevardnadze's government, and now Saakashvili’s, has consistently pressed claims against Abkhazia to settle the displaced. Abkhaz authorities announced specific quotas for the return of refugees (in May 1995 set at no more than 200 per week), but their security has been inadequately protected -- or deliberately neglected -- by both the government of Abkhazia and the 3,000 Russian peacekeepers deployed in the region since June 1994. To date, a few thousand ethnic Georgians have been officially allowed to return to their homes. The Abkhaz authorities have issued "registration cards" to returning Georgians, which identify them as being of Mingrelian ethnicity (Mingrelia is the region of western Georgia bordering Abkhazia whose people speak a distinct dialect of Georgian).

Today, these ethnic Georgians remaining in Abkhazia constitute a "majority at risk." This statement is not meant to obscure the past reality, or future possibility, of persecution of Abkhazians, but instead reflects the complexity of ethnic conflict in post-Soviet Georgia and the Caucasus in general. The situation for these Georgians remains extremely dangerous and continuous small clashes occur regularly. The difficulty of securing the lives and property of refugees is underscored by the 1998 expulsion of 30,000–40,000 Georgian returnees by Abkhaz troops following fighting in the Gali region. It is also reported that thousands (perhaps as many as 40,000) have returned unofficially, and therefore are not registered with any Abkhaz, Georgian or international governmental agency.

Ultimately, Abkhazia's Georgians will find security only when a comprehensive political settlement is reached between Tbilisi and the authorities in Sukhum(i). Given the complexity and intensity of Georgian and Abkhazian politics, and the potential spill-over effects of the region's multiple conflicts, lasting tranquility may depend on a larger Caucasian peace process. The wars in Chechnya posed a problem for the Abkhaz leadership in the past, for they received support from both Russia and Chechen fighters during their war for independence. However, the Abkhaz have not been supportive of the Chechen cause for at least the past five years, choosing instead to ally themselves with Moscow, whose peacekeepers are its ultimate guarantor of independence.

Other episodes of violence have occurred, especially earlier this decade. There were a series of infrequent, but violent, incidents involving Georgian and Abkhaz troops, including the 2001 downing of a UN helicopter and several deaths due to land mines (REB01-03 = 1); more recently, there have been fewer of such incidents (REB04-05 = 0; REB06 = 1). Sporadic intercommunal violence has been constant (INTERCON01-03; 06 = 1). In 2008, renewed violence, involving land, air and sea warfare, directly involved Russian troops in a five-day conflict with Georgian troops on one side and Russian, Ossetian and Abkhazian troops on the other.

Despite external pressure to reach some kind of agreement, repeated rounds of negotiations have not led to any solution to the political standoff between the Abkhaz and the Georgian government. Abkhazia declined Georgia's offer in September 1998 for "the highest status of political autonomy within an integral Georgian federative state" and has continued to refuse other similar offers by the new Georgian leadership. The demands remain the same: from the Abkhaz side, independence; and from the Georgian side, territorial integrity of Georgia and return of displaced Georgians.

In December 2000, Moscow placed travel restrictions on Georgian nationals, necessitating a visa for anyone wishing to enter The North Caucasus. These restrictions did not apply to citizens of the two break-away republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was widely interpreted as an attempt to further undermine Tblisi's influence in these regions. This scenario repeated itself in 2006 when Russia imposed a full land, sea, and air blockade of Georgia in response to a spy scandal, but did not include Abkhazia despite its legal status internationally as a territory within Georgia.

Since 2003, both Georgia and Abkhazia have elected new presidents: Saakashvili for Georgia and Bagapsh for Abkhazia. Bagapsh has not shown a greater willingness to negotiate, and remains committed to independence and close relations with Russia. Saakashvili, meanwhile, has made a clear commitment to reintegrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia during his tenure. The peace agreement reached after the 2008 conflict is tenuous, and tensions remain high between the two sides.

top

References

Council of Europe. 9/13/2001. “Honoring of obligations and commitments by Georgia.”

Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), Doc. 9191.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe . 1993. Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC.

Freedom House. 2003. Nations in Transit.

Hewitt, George. 1998. The Abkhazians. New York: St. Martin's Press.

International Crisis Group. Various reports on Georgia. 2003-2006. www.crisisgroup.org.

Jamestown Foundation. Various reports. 2004-2006. http://www.jamestown.org/

Lexis-Nexis. Various news reports. 2001-2006.

Matveeva, Anna. 2003. “Minorities in the South Caucasus.” Working Group on Minorities, Commission on Human Rights.

Mateeva, Anna. 2002. “The South Caucasus: Nationalism, Conflict and Minorities.” Minority Rights Group International Report.

Nodia, Ghia. 2001. “Georgia's Membership in the Council of Europe: Achievements and Failures.” Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development; compiled for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Various reports. 2004-2006

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2003. The Geography of Ethnic Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Reports: Georgia. 2001-2006.

U.S. State Department. International Religious Freedom Report: Georgia. 2001-2003.

top