Assessment for Russians in Kyrgyzstan

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Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan are unlikely to rebel in the foreseeable future. Ethnic Russian protest has been low to non-existent since Kyrgyz independence, with dissatisfaction primarily expressed through emigration. Consistent efforts on the part of Askar Akayev (1991-2005) also reduced the probability of violence. Furthermore, the government has not engaged in significant repression of ethnic Russians. Discrimination is primarily a result of societal division and not governmental policy.

Ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan have begun to organize politically to articulate their demands, rather than depending on Russian state influence to safeguard their interests. While protest remains nominal, a national congress was held in early 2002 with the purpose of organizing and mobilizing ethnic Russians for influencing Kyrgyz politics. This mobilization may be aided by ethnic Russians' concentration in the relatively more industrialized northern area of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in urban areas and their strong group identity. Therefore, ethnic Russian protest in Kyrgyzstan may see moderate increases in the near future. This may especially be the case if emerging authoritarian trends in Kyrgyzstan continue to limit institutional means of influencing politics in the country.

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Analytic Summary

Ethnic Russians first came to the Central Asian region as representatives of the Russian Empire, with the aim of overseeing the colonization process. Thus, few settled in the region before the Soviet period other than in a military capacity in service of the Empire. After the Soviet Union was established, millions of Russians were settled throughout Central Asia in accordance with Moscow's "Sovietization" plans, which for the largely Muslim Central Asians meant "Russification." Though the Soviet regime allowed many indigenous languages to develop in order to better propagate its ideology, in practice Russian became the dominant language of political life, administration and higher education throughout the USSR.

At present, the assertion of national, cultural, and religious traditions have become integral to the de-colonization process in the region. In response to demands of growing opposition groups, changes occurred under Communist Party chief Gorbachev's policy of glasnost in the late 1980s. Each Union Republic passed a language law declaring the native tongue as the state language, an issue that in several republics became a rallying point for nationalists. Language laws were meant only to restore native languages to their rightful place. Even with these changes, Russians maintained privileged positions within the Union Republics and rarely learned the language of the titular ethnic group. Hence, with the independence of these Union Republics, ethnic Russians find themselves in an awkward position.

The local assertion of national identity resulted in the formation of several Russian-oriented political groups claiming that rights of ethnic Russians were being violated. Though no major instances of violence directed specifically toward Russians has since occurred in any of the republics, Russians have been emigrating in large numbers since the 1990s, primarily for economic reasons (EMIG04-05 = 2; EMIG06 = 1); approximately 300,000 have left to date from Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the status of Russians resident outside of the Russian Federation has become a key political question, with hardliners calling for the defense of Russians who live in the "Near Abroad." Russian language still remains widely in use, although Kyrgyz is slowly replacing it; university education is primarily in Russian.

International observers initially had high hopes for democracy in Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev (1991-2005), though formerly a Communist, was the only Central Asian leader not to have emerged from its highest echelons, and thus he did not display the hostility to reforms found among other former Communists in the region. However, by the 2000 elections (which Akayev won with 74 percent of the vote amid accusations of widespread irregularities), Akayev's tenure had clearly turned authoritarian.

Despite these authoritarian developments, Akayev did make efforts to maintain inter-ethnic stability within the country. Accordingly he fostered a dialogue between the three largest ethnic groups, the Kyrgyz, Russians and Uzbeks, in an attempt to prevent resentments and misunderstandings from erupting into violent clashes. The President was successful in convincing Parliament to throw out a phrase from a bill on land ownership that would have limited property rights only to ethnic Kyrgyz.

Significantly, in November 2001, Kyrgyzstan amended its constitution to make Russian an official state language, supplementing an earlier law to that effect. Also, in 2002, Akayev appointed an ethnic Russian, Nikolai Tanayev, as prime minister of the country. Ethnic Russians also are beginning to mobilize more actively. In early 2002, a national congress was held in Bishkek for the purposes of articulating common interests of ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan.

After visits to Kyrgyzstan in 1992-93, staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) stated that they did not find any serious discrimination against ethnic Russians. While there is no evidence of political and economic discrimination in recent years (POLDIS04-06 = 0; ECDIS04-06 = 0), there is widespread societal discrimination against the use of Russian in school and in the media (CULPO200-02 = 1; CULPO203-06 = 2).

The central grievances of ethnic Russians are cultural and economic. Culturally, they advocate for the preservation of the Russian language's status as an official language in the Kyrgyz constitution and complain about recent language laws that call for the increased use of the Kyrgyz language in government institutions and social life (CULGR04-06 = 1). Economically, the primary demands appear to be for protection of their jobs and resources, especially from going to ethnic Kyrgyz (ECGR04-06 = 1).

Because of geopolitical and economic compulsions, the Republic has strongly defended the preservation of the CIS, recognizing its dependence particularly on Russia for its economic well-being. The issue of local Russians has been at the center of discussions between the two states. Dependence on Russian protection may have served to dampen ethnic Russian protest, which has consistently been low (PROT90X, PROT98X = 2; PROT01-03 = 1; PROT04-06 = 0). Despite a waning role in the region, Moscow's military and economic leverage (with Russian troops still remaining in the area) are likely to act as a brake against any overt policy of discrimination toward the remaining ethnic Russians in the area.

President Akaev's ouster following fraudulent parliamentary elections on February 27, 2005, created an air of uncertainty within the country, although violence, for the most part, has been avoided and did not target ethnic Russians. Opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev won the July 10, 2005, presidential elections with an overwhelming majority of the vote.

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References

Akayev, Askar. 1994. "Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Democratic Alternative," Democratizatsiya.

CSCE Briefing. 1/1993. Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union.

International Crisis Group. 2001. "Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the 'Island of Democracy'". ICG Asia Report No. 22. http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/centralasia/reports/A400403_28082001.pdf

International Crisis Group. 2004. "Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects." Asia Report No. 81.

LexisNexis. Various news reports. 1990-2006.

U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyzstan. 2001-2006.

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